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ABSTRACT
A case study was conducted on a selective contracting approach to hospital
reimbursement for Medicaid recipients in California. The study examines
the fiscal and political conditions under which hospital contracting was
adopted and the state's organizational response to the program.
Interviews with major actors involved with the hospital contracting
process were conducted to gain an understanding of the implementation
process and its effect on the state. Respondents included state and
legislative staff, spokespersons for the major interest groups, hospital
opinion leaders, and other researchers. In addition, a sample of 18
hospitals was selected in which the Chief Executive Officer, Chief
Financial Officer, Director of Nursing, and Medical Director were inter-
viewed. A total of 83 interviews were conducted from January 15 to
February 8, 1984 in California. Interview protocols were used to
structure the interview.
Key findings indicate that the state's 1982-1983 fiscal crisis was the
major force leading to the adoption of hospital contracting. However, two
additional factors influenced the structural reform: 1) the increasing
share that the Medicaid program was consuming of the state's General
Funds; and 2) the perverse incentives inherent in the organization of the
health care system. The state's organizational response to hospital
contracting was based on three problematic conditions: 1) an agency with
extraordinary discretionary power was established outside the existing
Medicaid agency to negotiate contracts with hospitals; 2) the existing
Medicaid agency was responsible for administering the contracts; and 3)
the decisions of the negotiating agency was linked to the activities of
the administering agency. Implications for the program's success are
discussed based on the findings from the adoption process and the state's
organizational response.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Gary Marx
Title: Professor of Sociology
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CHAPTER I: OVERVIEW
In the summer of 1982, the California Legislature sought to avoid
a major fiscal crisis by adopting a selective contracting approach to
hospital reimbursement for Medicaid recipients. This reform is arguably
the most drastic change in hospital reimbursement since the inception of
Medicaid. This report will examine the conditions under which hospital
contracting was adopted and the state's organizational response to this
untested, but innovative program.
A cost containment program's effectiveness cannot be assessed
solely on the basis of the analytic techniques used to control hospital
expenditures. An appreciation of the conditions that surround the
adoption process, as well as of the economic and political forces that
shape program objectives, must be part of an overall assessment of program
outcomes. A historical appreciation is necessary, because those
conditions surrounding a program's adoption are ultimately reflected in a
program's objectives, authority, organizational structure, and operating
characteristics.
This report will provide valuable insight for other states
considering similar reform. Similarly, a prior understanding of the
setting, actors, and state organizational responses will serve as a
foundation for analyzing the effects of hospital contracting on hospitals,
patients, and third party payers. Thus, the scope of this report does not
include results from the bidding process nor any quantitative analysis,
but focuses on an analysis of the early decisions and implementation of
hospital contracting.
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1.1 Historical Structure of Medicaid Program
Medicaid is a jointly funded federal and state entitlement
program with eligibility criteria broadly established by the federal
government and based primarily on the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children and Supplemental Security Income welfare programs. As a vendor
payment program, it reimburses individual providers on a modified fee-for-
service basis. In particular, hospital reimbursement was required to use
Medicare's cost-based "reasonable cost" reimbursement principles.
Historically, Medicaid hospital reimbursement has rested on two
broad concepts: cost-based reimbursement and beneficiary freedom of
choice. These concepts supported the goal of incorporating the poor into
mainstream medicine. The first concept assumed that the most equitable
manner of hospital reimbursement for Medicaid recipients was to reimburse
a share of the hospital's actual costs proportionate to the Medicaid share
of utilization. Medicaid recipients would also be free, according to the
second principle, to receive care in whichever hospital they wanted.
Thus, Medicaid recipients would enjoy the same access to care enjoyed by
any other insured segment of the population.
The Medicaid program, framed by these two fundamental principles,
worked remarkably well to increase the access to hospital care for the
poor. Unfortunately, as is now universally recognized, these two concepts
had other effects. Medicaid hospital payments soared as hospitals
discovered they could increase costs with virtual impunity. Other payers
were either reimbursing on a cost-related basis or were sufficiently
insensitive to cost issues that they failed to counter the cost shift.
Medicaid programs had neither a basis for lowering unit costs nor for
directing patients to less expensive hospitals.
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Throughout the seventies, dissatisfaction with the cost-based
approach to hospital reimbursement for both Medicare and Medicaid grew.
Demonstration waivers were granted allowing states to control the rate of
Medicaid growth with programs which directly regulated the rate of
increase in hospital expenses. These programs, through a series of
regulatory mechanisms, more or less dictated the amount by which hospital
rates could increase from one period to the next. However, these programs
continued to require special waivers which were difficult to obtain while
the freedom of choice provisions were untouched.
In 1981, Congress adopted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA, P.L. 97-35) which encompassed the most radical changes in Medicaid
reimbursement since the onset of the program. States were given the
flexibility to design alternative reimbursement systems and to obtain
waivers from the freedom of choice provisions. With this legislation, the
historical principles of cost-based reimbursement and beneficiary freedom
of choice became obsolete.
In 1982, California was in the throes of a fiscal crisis and
seized the opportunity afforded by the OBRA of 1981. The California
Legislature established MediCal (as Medicaid is called in California)
reform that was unlike any Medicaid program in the nation. The state was
allowed to contract for MediCal services with individual hospitals.
Hospitals which did not meet the state's terms, including price, would be
excluded from the MediCal program. Reimbursement to hospitals meeting the
state's terms would be based on an alternative to the traditional fee-for-
service and reasonable cost reimbursement method. Moreover, recipients
would be "locked-in" and redirected to those hospitals with MediCal
contracts.
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Within one year, 246 contracts were signed with hospitals in the
areas where the state implemented contracting. Approximately 67 percent
of the hospitals and the licensed beds in these areas were under contract,
representing about 85 percent of the historical utilization of MediCal
recipients (days and admissions).' William Guy, the man chosen to direct
this program, claimed that hospital contracting was the most significant
change in hospital finance since the advent of Social Security.
1.2 Methodology
Interviews with the major actors involved with the hospital
contracting process were conducted to gain an understanding of the
implementation process and its effect on the state. As Table 1.1
demonstrates, respondents included state and legislative staff,
spokespersons for the major interest groups, hospital opinion leaders, and
other researchers. In addition to these policy level respondents, a
sample of 18 hospitals (contracting and non-contracting) was selected in
which the Chief Executive Officer, the Chief Financial Officer, the
Director of Nursing, and the Medical Director were interviewed. In
several hospitals, the Director of Utilization Review and other hospital
staff involved with the contract negotiations were also interviewed.
The hospital sampling strategy was based on health care delivery
systems, rather than on individual hospitals across the state. Hospitals
sharing single market areas were selected. All hospitals within four
market areas, or Health Facility Planning Areas (HFPAs) were identified as
potential respondents.2 Four different types of HFPA's were chosen:
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Table 1.1: Number of Interviews Conducted by Type of Respondent
January to March 1984
Hospital Site Visits 18
Hospital Opinion Leaders 9
Medical Lobbies 4
Legislators or Staff 5
CMAC Commissioners 3
CMAC or GOSHN Staff 6
Insurance Companies 4
California Department of Field Offices
Health Services (DHS) 5
Other DHS Staff 11
Consumer Advocates 6
Other Researchers 4
County Officials 2
Othera 6
TOTAL 83
aThe Other category includes: the Fiscal Intermediary; representatives from
the Departments of Finance, Insurance and Corporations; HCFA Regional Office;
and the County Hospitals Association.
5
" an inner city area with high MediCal concentration;
" a non-inner city area with high MediCal concentration;
" a suburban area with relatively low MediCal concentration; and
" a medium sized city.
The California Department of Health Services (DHS) field office was
visited and a local consumer advocate was interviewed in each HFPA.
Altogether, 22 hospitals were targeted for site visits. Three
declined to participate and one agreed to participate but scheduling
difficulties precluded its participation. Table 1.2 summarizes the
hospital sample in terms of contracting status, ownership type, bed size
and California Health Facilities Commission peer group assignment and
compares the sample to all hospitals in the state. It can be seen that
the sample of hospitals visited was similar to the state in terms of
contracting status and ownership type but was biased toward larger
hospitals. This result is not a serious concern since most MediCal
services are, in fact, provided in larger hospitals.
The site visits were conducted from January 15 to February 8,
1984 as part of a larger project on hospital reimbursement. Interview
protocols were developed and used as a guide to structure the interview.
I conducted about two thirds of the interviews, while the site team
finished the remaining third. Follow-up telephone calls in February and
March supplemented the on-site interviews.
1.3 Organization of Report
Chapter II examines the adoption process of hospital
contracting. The discussion includes an analysis of the passage of the
legislation, a description of the enabling legislation, and an examination
6
Table 1.2: Characteristics of Sample Hospitals Compared to State
Hospital Characteristics
Number In Number In
Sample Percent In Statea Percent In
(n=18) Sample (n=365) State
Contract Status
Contracting 13 72% 245 67%
Noncontracting 5 28% 120 33%
Ownership
Nonprofit 10 55% 187 51%
Investor 5 28% 123 34%
City, county or
district 3 17% 55 15%
Bed Size
1-99 1 6% 127 35%
100-299 9 50% 161 44%
300 + 8 44% 77 21%
Peer Groupb
Teaching 3 17% 21 6%
Large complex 8 44% 68 19%
Moderate size 5 28% 92 25%
Small urban 2 11% 107 29%
Other -- -- 77 21%
aSource: Calculated from data for non-exempt hospitals in HFPAs closed by
August 1, 1983 as presented in California Department of Health Services,
First Annual Report to the Health Care Financing Administration on the
Selective Provider Contracting Program, August 1983. There are 104 non-
exempt hospitals.
bAll California hospitals are assigned to peer groups by the California Health
Care Facilities Commission.
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of the early decisions and implementation of hospital contracting.
Chapter III addresses the state's response to the legislation, including
questions about the necessity of the organizational requirements of the
legislation. Finally, Chapter IV summarizes the key findings of the
adoption process and the state's response to hospital contracting. Based
on these findings, implications for the program's success are discussed.
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CHAPTER II: ADOPTION PROCESS
Before examining the impetus for legislative change and the
roles that various political actors played in how hospital contracting
unfolded, it is important to recognize that health care is big business in
California. Indeed, as Table 2.1 indicates, there are over 500 hospitals
in the state, a third of which are investor-owned. In fiscal year 1981-
1982, California hospitals as a whole received close to $13 billion in
revenues, the majority (84%) received for inpatient services. Medicare
and private payers were the primary sources, accounting for 82 percent of
the revenues, while MediCal accounted for 18 percent.1
While total hospital revenues are high, they are distributed
among many hospitals within a fragmented and overbedded market. Most
hospitals (46 percent) are small containing less than 100 licensed beds
and an average occupancy rate of 63 percent.2 Despite this relatively low
occupancy rate, total expenditures for acute hospital inpatient costs in
fiscal year 1981-1982 totaled $8.7 billion, a 19 percent increase over the
FY 1980-1981 inpatient costs. 3 The average length of a patient's stay in
FY 1981-1982 was seven days, costing close to $405 day.4
These hospital characteristics indicate a fragmented health care
market. However, the lobbies representing the health care industry are
not. The California Medical Association (CMA) and the California Hospital
Association (CHA) are one of the most powerful lobby groups in the
state. Neither association had lost a major battle with the California
Legislature until hospital contracting appeared.
With these hospital characteristics and political factors in
mind, let us now turn to what has been hailed as the most innovative
9
Table 2.1: Selected Characteristics of the Hospital Industry in
California
Fiscal Year 1981 - 1982a
Ownership Status
Beds
Non-Profit
Invenstor-Owned
District/County/City
Percent of Hospitals
(n = 546)
45%
34%
22%
Percent of Licensed
(n = 89,404)
55%
23%
23%
Percent of Hospitals
(n = 546)
46%
38%
16%
Hospital
Revenue Source
(Gross Revenue =
($12.6 Billion)
Medicare
MediCal
Other
Total
Percent of
All Services
37%
18%
45%
Percent of
Inpatient
Services
Percent of
Outpatient
Services
34%
15%
36%
- 84%
3%
3%
10%
16%
Source: California Health Facilities Commission, Report Periods Ending
June 30, 1981 - June 29, 1982.
aIncludes all hospitals in the state, exempt and non-exempt from
hospital contracting.
NOTE: Percents may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
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Bed Size
1 - 99
100 - 299
300 +
approach to health care cost containment: MediCal hospital contracting.
Characteristics of the Medical Program in California are described in
Section 2.1 before examining the passage of the enabling legislation in
Section 2.2. The Legislation itself is discussed in Section 2.3.
Finally, Section 2.4 examines the implementation of hospital contracting.
2.1 Overview of MediCal in California
California has one of the more generous Medicaid benefit
packages in the United States, providing the services required by federal
law as well as offering an extensive list of optional services. 5 The
state's eligibility standards for MediCal are similarly liberal including
coverage for the Medically Needy and a state-funded program for Medically
Indigent Adults (MIAs). 6
Since its implementation in 1966, the MediCal program has
grown into a major enterprise in California, providing over three million
recipients with Medicaid benefits. Second only to New York, California
MediCal payments to providers exceeded $4.1 billion in 1981.7
Incorporating the poor into the "mainstream" health care system appeared,
on the surface, to be working. However, by the early 1970's, like the
rest of the health care industry, the perverse incentives inherent in
cost-based reimbursement was recognized. Structural reforms were
advocated, but consensus on what those reforms were to look like was
impossible to achieve.
The California Hospital Association (CHA) favored hospital rate
regulation as the best approach to insure payer equity. Commercial
insurers supported hospital rate regulation as a way of controlling
11
inflation and cost shifting. Thus, legislation in 1971 established
mandatory reporting and disclosure of hospital costs as a preliminary step
towards health facilities regulation. While the health care industry was
not exactly eager for regulation of any kind, legislative and consumer
pressure to control hospital costs was strong.
In 1978, legislators gave the health industry their "last
chance" to control hospital costs before government intervention. The CHA
and the CMA agreed to a "voluntary effort" at cost-containment in which an
annual ceiling of hospital rate increases was identified. However, this
voluntary effort failed: in 1981 and the first two quarters of 1982, the
California hospitals' rate of increase was above the ceiling.
Anticipating the failure of the voluntary effort, the
Legislature enacted AB 251, "MediCal's Six Percent Solution," in June
1981. MediCal inpatient reimbursement in fiscal year 1981-82 was limited
to six percent over the average amount paid, on a per discharge basis,
during the previous year. In addition, DHS was required to experiment
with alternative methods of MediCal management on a limited basis.
However, the necessary federal waivers were not granted quickly. The six
percent cap was subsequently challenged legally by the CHA. Six months
after AB 251 was passed, the court ruled against the state. The DHS was
forced to restore interim hospital payment rates to levels in effect prior
to January 15, 1982 and was unable to implement its pilot projects.
During this same period, the state estimated that MediCal payments would
reach $4.3 billion in FY 1981-82, consuming over 15 percent of the state's
General Fund budget. 8
The continuous escalation in MediCal expenditures was
threatening the state's fiscal stability. MediCal had been growing at an
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annual rate of 14 percent since the mid-1970's, while the Governor's
budget projected General Fund revenue increases of only 9.8 percent in
1982-83. Since 1978, however, the state has had limited capacity to raise
revenues. Property taxes, a major source of local revenues, had been
reduced by 50 percent when Proposition 13 became effective in June 1978.
Under this initiative, property tax increases were also limited to one
percent of market value. Additional local revenue restrictions were
enacted in November 1979. Proposition 4 limited local and state
appropriations increases and prevented local and state governments from
retaining surplus funds. In addition to the state's inability to raise
local revenues was the general fiscal condition of the country.
California was not spared the national economic recessions in 1980 and
1981. In January 1982, projected state revenues were the lowest for any
fiscal year in California history. Unemployment, industrial growth,
taxable sales and other economic indicators were all below projections.9
Compounding California's potential revenue shortfall was the
federal government's fiscal crisis. Adopting their own cost-containment
measures, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-35)
reduced the federal share of Medicaid reimbursement by three percent in
1982, four percent in 1983, and 4.5 percent in 1984. The estimated impact
of these reductions was to decrease California's General Fund revenues by
$76.9 million in 1982-83. Thus, when the California Legislature was faced
with the constitutional obligation to balance the state's 1982-83 budget,
a $2 billion deficit was projected.10 Given the climate of the previous
"tax revolts," raising taxes was not an effective option to increase
revenues. On the contrary, legislators had to find a way to reduce
expenditures.
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MediCal, was one observer notes, was a "ripe target" for
cutbacks in 1982.11 The previous legislative session had reduced the
state's AFDC program, leaving MediCal and education as the remaining major
budget items susceptible to further savings. Proposition 13 had already
left its imprint on the educational sector by reducing local revenues.
Thus, there was no choice but to target MediCal for "draconian budget
cuts". 12 In the spring of 1982, the Legislature, without a clear proposal
for reform, agreed to slash $500 million from the MediCal budget.
2.2 Passage of AB 799, AB 3480, and SB 2012
No single approach to the $500 million budget cut prevailed
among the legislators. In March 1982, a small bipartisan working group of
legislative leadership began to meet weekly to develop proposals for
MediCal reform. The proposals included the traditional options of
eliminating or reducing benefits, restricting eligibility, and decreasing
reimbursement rates. Hospital rate regulation, favored by many
legislators and by consumer, labor and elderly groups, was seriously
debated with intense opposition from health care industry lobbyists.
Selective hospital contracting, in a number of configurations,
was also discussed. Contracting was not a new concept to the
Legislature. In 1972, one form had been implemented within the MediCal
program as pre-paid health care. Contracting was further studied by the
DHS in 1978, and each year thereafter, contracting was unsuccessfully
recommended or introduced into the Legislature. However, in 1982, the
factors that previously prevented selective contracting from serious
consideration were conspicuously absent. The CHA and CMA had been
defeated by their own "voluntary effort," traditional party politics were
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united by developing proposals for reform within the working group, and
time was running out to balance the state's budget. The state's fiscal
crisis, coupled with the unilateral agreement among legislators that
MediCal reform was necessary, provoked serious consideration of hospital
contracting. Furthermore, barriers- to implementation were surmounted when
the Federal Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 was passed: HCFA
could now grant state waivers for beneficiary freedom of choice and
alternatives to cost-based reimbursement.
Selective hospital contracting was gaining bipartisan support by
the end of April 1982. However, a DHS working paper reported that
selective contracting would take three years to implement--too late to
affect the current deficit. Soon thereafter, legislative leaders
responded to the DHS conclusion by conceiving of an ingeneous approach
that would circumvent the bureaucratic delay: a "special negotiator"
outside DHS would be created to negotiate selective contracts.
It was at this point that William Guy, retiring president of
Southern Blue Cross was invited to speak with the then Governor Brown and
legislative leadership. Their discussion focussed on the feasibility of
such a contracting program. Mr. Guy, familiar with hospital contracting
through his experience with negotiating inpatient reimbursement rates for
Blue Cross' HMO, insisted that contracting was possible, but with one
crucial caveat: if contracting was to be effective, it had to be
implemented quickly by one person with complete authority. 1 3
With the apparent endorsement of Mr. Guy, an experienced and
respected practitioner, the Legislature promptly drafted legislation
incorporating hospital contracting into AB 799, a bill proposing other
MediCal amendments. The perception that hospital contracting would
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introduce "competition" into the health care system attracted instant
legislative support. Indeed, an approach that created incentives to
reduce hospital costs and satisfied the health industry's opposition to
regulation was appealing.
The CHA and CMA reactions to AB 799, however, were far from
supportive. While the CHA publicly endorsed the principle of
"competition," the legislature's translation lacked adequate safeguards to
insure access and quality of care. Similarly, the CMA, always protecting
the fee-for-service model, perceived contracting to be a threat to this
model and to their freedom of medical practice. The powerful lobbies of
CHA and CMA, backed by their successful record of defeating major reforms
in the health care system, vehemently criticized the legislation without
providing any alternatives to solve the fiscal crisis. The Legislature,
for the first time in years, did not succumb to the lobbies' pressures.
The insurance industry, on the other hand, saw AB 799 as an
opportunity to gain control over hospital costs. Traditionally, insurance
companies pay "customary and reasonable" charges, as set by hospitals.
However, if the insurance industry was granted the same hospital
contracting privileges as the state, then insurers could set the rate.
Furthermore, insurance industry analysts realized that MediCal contracting
could increase hospital charges to private patients. This potential
increase in cost-shifting inspired a simple solution: replace the
"freedom of choice" clause from the Insurance Code with a provision
allowing insurers to negotiate with hospitals for "alternative rates."
Thus, "competition" would be introduced into the private health care
sector as well. AB 3480 was quickly drafted and tied procedurely to AB
799. AB 799 and AB 3480 were signed into law on June 29, 1982, less than
two months after Mr. Guy's appearance.
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By all accounts, the legislative process that passed AB 799 and
AB 3480 was atypical. The speed with which the bills were passed, the
dismal conditions of the state budget, the bipartisan support, and the
unsuccessful lobby efforts by CHA and CMA contributed to a process like no
other. It was as if all the conventional rules were suspended in order to
get contracting through the Legislature. Yet, perhaps, the greatest
surprise was the influence of Mr. Guy. One Senate staff member
remarked: "That is the first time I have ever seen a bill drafted to fit
a person." Indeed, this comment reflects the unmistakable impression that
Mr. Guy had on the Legislature.
2.3 The Legislation
The legislation enabling MediCal hospital contracting is
embodied in two statutes: Assembly Bill 799 (AB 799) and a "clean-up"
bill, Senate Bill 2012 (SB 2012). In addition to establishing selective
contracting with MediCal, these two bills authorize benefit and
eligibility reductions. DHS emphasized that these reductions were
reluctantly passed by both Democractic and Republican leadership as a
result of the "painful economic realities" to balance the California
budget. The total fiscal package of reductions and program reform was
estimated to save $372 million in state funds, rather than $500 million as
originally planned. 14 The reductions in benefits and eligibility are
summarized first, before discussing the specific legislation establishing
hospital contracting.
The most significant benefit change redefined the definition of
medical necessity. Language was adopted by the Legislature that narrowed
the definition of "medical necessity." Previously, the standard for
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furnishing MediCal benefits simply required a "medical necessity."
However, AB 799 fundamentally changed the standard to include only
services that are "medically necessary to protect life or prevent
significant disability."1 5 The effect of this change was to deny coverage
for services that are not absolutely necessary to protect life or prevent
a significant disability. As a result, MediCal patients will have more
difficulty obtaining elective services. In particular, coverage for
elective surgery and medical procedures, drug products, podiatric and
therapy services, vision care and dental services, were all significantly
reduced. The state's prior authorization system is the vehicle through
which these services will be denied. In addition to the benefit
reductions, MediCal reimbursement to providers was reduced. With few
exceptions, reimbursement was reduced by ten percent for the following
services: physician and hospital outpatient services; hearing aids;
acupuncture, portable X-ray, chiropractor and psychology services; and
drug dispensing, laboratory and pathology fees. 16
The most dramatic eligibility change eliminated the MIA
eligibility category from the MediCal program and required county
governments to assume responsibility for this population. Counties were
given the authority to determine what services will be provided and by
whom. Approximately 270,000 MIAs statewide were affected by this shift in
responsibility. However, counties were funded with only 70 percent of the
costs that would have been expended under MediCal for the period of
January 1 through July 30, 1983. On an annualized basis, this allocation
represented an 85 percent funding level.17 This shift in MIA responsi-
bility was estimated to produce the greatest savings in general funds. 18
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In addition to eliminating the MIA category from MediCal, other
eligibility reductions embodied in the legislation meant that people will
have to spend more of their own money on their health care needs each
month before they.are eligible for MediCal. Specifically, the needs
standard for MediCal was reduced to the lowest level that would qualify
California for federal financial participation; special income deductions
for the aged, blind, and disabled were eliminated; MediCal coverage for
the optional Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Unemployed adults
(AFDC-U) was eliminated; parental responsibility for children over 18 was
increased; verification of MediCal application information was required
before eligibility determination; and real estate value limits were
reduced. The effect of these reductions makes it more difficult for
people to become eligible for MediCal.
Similar to the changes in benefits and eligibility, hospital
contracting was intended to generate short-run savings. For FY 1982-83,
hospital contracting was estimated to save approximately $100 million in
general funds. However, the potential for long-run savings and efficiency
rests on the fundamental change in the delivery of MediCal and in the
reimbursement mechanisms. AB 799 sets forth the legislation establishing
this reform.
AB 799 authorizes the Governor to appoint a "special negotiator
to negotiate rates, terms and conditions for contracts with hospitals for
inpatient services to be rendered to MediCal program beneficiaries." The
special negotiator has "maximum discretion and flexibility" to arrange the
provision of health services, as long as significant savings are achieved.
AB 799 does not discourage a bidding process. Indeed, the legislation
specifies that if the special negotiator "deems it expedient, call(ing)
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for bids, in lieu of negotiations" is acceptable. The negotiator was to
serve for one year, from July 1, 1982 to June 30, 1983, at which time a
seven member commission, the California Medical Assistance Commission
(CMAC) was to assume all duties, and the special negotiator would become
the executive director of CMAC. To expedite the negotiator's
responsibilities, all rules and regulations were "deemed to be an
emergency...(and) not subject to the review or approval of the Office of
Administrative Law." To insure the special negotiator's authority, AB 799
was amended whereby activities "which reveal the special negotiator's
deliberative processes, impressions, opinions, recommendations, meeting
minutes, research, work product, theories, or strategy" were exempted from
public disclosure.1 9 The special negotiator was afforded extreme liberty
to achieve savings.
In addition to considering the total appropriation, the
negotiator was to use nine criteria in Section 14.083 of AB 799 to
contract for inpatient services:
1) beneficiary access;
2) utilization controls;
3) ability to render quality services efficiently and
economically;
4) demonstrated ability to provide or arrange needed
specialized services;
5) protection against fraud and abuse;
6) any other factors which would reduce costs, promote access,
or enhance the quality of care;
7) the capacity to provide a given tertiary service, such as
specialized childrens' services, on a regional basis;
8) recognition of the variations in severity of illness and
complexity care; and
9) existing labor-management collective bargaining agreements."
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Inpatient services provided by childrens' and charitable research
hospitals are exempt from the negotiator's provisions, as are inpatient
services to beneficiaries "who live or reside farther than the community
travel time standard from a contract hospital.. .if the hospital providing
services is closer than a contract hospital."2 0
AB 799 also established a seven member commission, CMAC, which
was to assume all the negotiator's responsibilities as of July 1, 1983.
However, AB 799 also specified that CMAC take office as of January 1,
1983, six months prior to relieving the negotiator of his duties. During
this overlapping tenure with the negotiator, CMAC was required to "monitor
and review" the activities of the negotiator. CMAC was given one
additional role: to negotiate contracts for hospital outpatient services.
As mentioned previously, AB 3480, a companion bill tied
procedurally to AB 799, authorized similar hospital privileges for the
insurance industry. While not a focus of this study, commercial insurers'
new ability to contract with providers nonetheless affects hospitals'
incentives to contract for MediCal patients. Indeed, hospitals could
become the battleground in which commercial insurers compete with the
state to secure hospital contracts.
AB 3480 authorized insurers to offer two types of health
insurance arrangements to its subscribers: preferred provider and
exclusive provider packages. Effective January 1, 1983 an insurance
company could:
"...negotiate and enter in contracts for alternative rates of
payment with institutional providers, and offer the benefit of
such alternative rates to insureds who select such providers."21
Such contracts could also be negotiated with non-institutional, or
professional, providers commencing July 1, 1983. While not stated
21
explicitly in the legislation, the above arrangement represents a
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO). If the insured choses to receive
care from the preferred provider, he will benefit from the alternative
rate.
On the other hand, insurance companies could restrict
traditional consumer freedom. Effective January 1, 1983, insurers could
negotiate and enter contracts which:
"limit payments under a policy to services secured by insureds
from institutional providers charging alternative rates." 2 2
Similarly, such contracts could be negotiated with professionals beginning
six months later. Again, the term "exclusive provider organization" (EPO)
was not mentioned, but the limited nature of the contract implies an EPO
arrangement. Subscribers using non-preferred providers will not be
reimbursed. Reimbursement will be made only in the event that the
subscriber uses the insurer's designated preferred provider. The final
legislative initiative relating to the insurance industry was contained in
the clean-up bill, SB 2012. The Insurance Commissioner, who oversees the
insurance industry, was mandated to regulate the provision of EPO's to
ensure that EPO contracts:
"...include programs for the continuous review of the quality of
care, performance of medical personnel, [and] utilization of
services and fmilities and costs by professionally unrelated
third parties.
2.4 Implementation of AB 799
Implementation of AB 799 was carried out with the same speed and
fervor that was applied to its passage. The urgency clause in AB 799
obviously helped. Confronting the Governor was the selection of the
special negotiator, or "Czar" as the press appropriately dubbed the
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position. Indeed, the early decisions made by the "Czar" and his staff
would set the tenor for a new era in health care delivery.
The selection of the "special negotiator" was no surprise.
William Guy's appointment was announced in early July 1982, within two
weeks of AB 799 enactment. Not only were Mr. Guy's qualifications superb,
but he was politically acceptable as well. Initially, Mr. Guy was
reluctant to accept the position, as his immediate plans included retiring
to Maryland. However, when AB 799 passed with the stipulation that the
Czar exist for only one year, Mr. Guy accepted the position. Several
respondents characterized the decision as Mr. Guy's "swan song" before his
retirement.
The special negotiator's first task was to assemble a staff
capable of conducting negotiations with some 500 hospitals. There were no
job descriptions, yet ten people were hired: two assistants, six
negotiators, a data manager, and a student intern. All positions were
exempt from civil service and resided in the executive branch of the
Governor's Office of Selective Hospital Negotiations (GOSHN). Guy sought
people with health care experience, but expertise in health care finance,
law, or MediCal administration was not necessary. Guy simply wanted
people who would not be intimidated by a negotiation process. The process
and criteria used to hire GOSHN staff reflects the non-bureaucratic style
Guy was known for. As one respondent noted, "Guy worked out of his hip
pocket, there is no paper trail."
Despite Mr.Guy's distaste of bureaucratic detail, there was one
task he could not avoid. In order for the state to contract for inpatient
services, federal waivers had to be submitted and approved by HCFA. In
August 1982, DHS and GOSHN jointly submitted five waivers from
California's state plan:
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1) Freedom of Choice Waiver: This waiver allowed the state to
restrict beneficiary choice to hospitals awarded a MediCal
contract;
2) Single State Agency Waiver: This waiver allowed the state
to create GOSHN and CMAC as entities separate from the DHS,
the single state agency responsible for administering the
MediCal program;
3) Alternative Payment Waiver: This waiver allowed the state
to negotiate alternative rates of payment that do not
necessarily meet the "reasonable and adequate rate"
requirement;
4) Statewideness Waiver: This waiver allowed the state to
phase in the implementation of hospital contracting; and
5) Utilization Controls Waiver: This waiver allowed the
Director of DHS to waive utilization control requirements for
hospitals contracting with the state.
With the federal waivers into HCFA, COSHN was ready to develop a
strategy to implement hospital contracting. AB 799 left much of the
contracting details to the discretion of the special negotiator. Guy and
his staff had many policy decisions to make. Among the early decisions
that GOSHN resolved included the treatment of beneficiary access and
quality of care, the method of reimbursement, the contract form,
geographic specifications for negotiation, and the framework for the
negotiation process.
The provisions of AB 799 specified that the negotiator had the
choice of "call(ing) for bids in lieu of negotiat(ing)" contracts with
hospitals. 2 4 Rather than issue a formal RFP, GOSHN favored negotiating
contracts with individual hospitals. However, as will be described later,
the process that emerged was more akin to a hybrid of both approaches.
The first of nine criteria, expressed in Section 14.083 of AB
799, required that GOSHN consider beneficiary access in awarding MediCal
contracts. Contrary to the widespread assumption that a limited number of
hospitals would receive contracts, Guy explicitly stated a "desire to
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contract with every hospital possible."2 5 Indeed, former GOSHN staff
explained that they deliberately erred in the direction of excess bed
capacity, not only to insure access to care, but also to have beds they
could bargain with for the second year of contracting.
Beneficiary access to care was insured further by the
development of a community travel time standard. If any beneficiary
resided further than the standard travel time for his or her community
from a contract hospital, DHS would authorize care in the closest non-
contract hospital. At GOSHN's request, DHS conducted a study to determine
the travel patterns of beneficiaries. Historical travel times for
inpatient services were calculated for each county and used by GOSHN in
evaluating which hospitals to select as contractors. Using the standards
and information on the distribution of beneficiaries in an area, GOSHN
could evaluate whether the majority of patients resided within a
reasonable geographic distance of contract hospitals.
Similarly, GOSHN had to consider a hospital's "ability to render
quality services efficiently and economically" in awarding MediCal
contracts. 2 6 However, GOSHN did not see itself as an authority to
evaluate quality of care, nor as a legal entity to enforce sanctions
against providers not meeting quality standards. The DHS Licensing and
Certification Division maintains this responsibility. Thus, hospitals
passing Licensing and Certification audits were considered as meeting the
14.083 quality criteria. On the other hand, GOSHN could ensure that these
quality services were rendered equally among patients -- private and
government payers alike. Contract offers could not include provisions
that segregated MediCal patients from other patients through either
services, beds, or buildings. GOSHN would only accept contracts that
treated MediCal patients like other patients.
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The decision to reimburse hospitals on a per diem basis was
considered to be the most expedient payment method, given the
circumstances. However, staff claim that they never intended the per diem
rate to be the unit of reimbursement forever. At the time, the priority
was to identify a reimbursement method that was easy for the state to
understand and administer, maximized hospital risk, and required
relatively few data to establish a given hospital's preferred contract
rate. Psychiatric services were allowed to be a separate rate than
general acute services (i.e., medical-surcial, obstetric, pediatric
services), favoring that the hospital, rather than the state, be at
risk. Under the same assumption, the per diem was to be an "all-
inclusive" rate including all general acute services, rejecting a per diem
that would allow exceptions for high-cost ancillary procedures.
The model contract further maximized hospital risk. The model
contract contained provisions specifying that the hospital was to assume
responsibility for all services rendered to MediCal patients, regardless
of the origin of the service. That is, if a patient presented himself to
the contract hospital and later was referred to another hospital for
specialized services, the originating hospital would be responsible for
billing the state and reimbursing the receiving hospital. However,
deviations from the model contract were common and became the norm, rather
than the exception.
The model contract, itself, was originally drafted by GOSHN.
However, as the agency responsible for administering and signing the
hospital contracts, DHS was keenly interested in reviewing COSHN's version
of the contract. Several DHS staff reported that GOSHN was initially
reluctant to have such a review. A former GOSHN negotiator, on the other
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hand, indicated that DHS comments were welcome, but that GOSHN did not
always agree with their suggestions. This tension between GOSHN and DHS
eventually erupted, delaying hospital contract implementation by one
month.
Specification of the geographic areas on which negotiations
would be based was critical. Hospitals had to compete against each other
in a given community or area in order to create the incentive to lower
their bids. Fortunately, state data bases were organized by health
facility planning areas (HFPAs), units long used by HSA's to project bed
need and review CON requests. Since HFPAs were accessable and familiar
units, GOSHN analyzed historical MediCal costs and utilization of
hospitals within one HFPA, as well as comparing HFPA average costs and
utilization relative to other HFPAs.
The HFPA sequence in which negotiations took place was also
crucial. Anecdotes circulating among hospitals about the negotiation
process may influence future negotiations in other HFPAs. Acknowledging
this potential learning curve among hospitals, Guy wanted to conduct the
first phase of negotiations in HFPAs that would display instructive,
"dramatic and decisive results." 2 7 Urban HFPAs with high concentrations
of MediCal patients were selected to be the initial HFPAs in which to
negotiate. As Table 2.2 shows, HFPAs with high percentages of historical
MediCal expenditures entered the GOSHN negotiations in February 1983. Los
Angeles, with the highest historical MediCal expenditure percentage,
entered the negotiation process two months later, after observing a much
publicized negotiation process in San Francisco.
The proposed framework for the negotiation process was fairly
simple. A letter of invitation to negotiate a MediCal contract would be
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Table 2.2: HFPA Sequence of Negotiations and Historical Share of
Non-MIA Expenditures
Effective Date
February 1983
March 1983
April 1983
May 1983
June 1983
July 1983
HFPA Number
423,425
Daly City
311
923,933
1418,1420,1422
415,417,421
428,429,431
903,905,907,909
911,913,915,917,919
921,925,927,935
937
1412,1414
1012,1013,1014,1015
511,513,515,516,517
607,608
703
801
1209
313
309,505,509,601,605
809,811,901
405,411
1105,1109,1111,1207
1416
413
General Area
San Francisco/
Sacramento
Long Beach/Lynwood
San Diego
East Bay
Santa Clara
San Fernando Valley
San Gabriel Valley
Los Angeles
La Canada
San Diego North
Orange County
Merced/Modesto
Central Valley
Santa Cruz
San Luis Obispo
San Bernardino
Woodland
Central Valley
Oxnard/Lancaster
Contra Costa County
Riverside/San
Bernardino
Counties
San Diego North
Richmond
Percent of
Historical
Non-MIA
Expenditures
6.5
3.5
6.5
4.5
5.7
4.8
4.0
4.2
18.6
.0
.7
4.9
2.1
.2
.3
.4
3.7
.2
4.2
1.8
1.4
2.9
1.8
.6
August 1983 213
408
617
1107
Susanville
Fairfield
Bakersfield
Banning
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.0
.2
1.3
.1
Source: First Annual Report to the Health Care Financing Administration on
the Selective Provider Contracting Program, Volume 1, California Department of
Health Services, August 1983.
sent to every hospital. Hospitals returning the acceptance letter to
participate would be invited to Sacramento for two meetings. The first
meeting would consist of an orientation to MediCal contracting in which
Mr. Guy basically laid out the "rules of the game." The second meeting
would be held several weeks later in which the hospital representative(s)
would present their bid to one of the six negotiators. The negotiator
would ultimately present bids from hospitals in one HFPA to Mr. Guy, the
data manager, and the two assistants. Each hospital's bid would be
compared to GOSHN's data base of historical costs. If a hospital's bid
was too high, that hospital would have a chance to submit another bid.
Only Mr. Guy would make the final decision of "yea" or "nay." The
negotiator would notify each hospital of their decision, while the
Governor's office would issue press releases. An HFPA was considered to
be "closed" after all the negotiations were finished. Negotiations were
antici'pated to span one or two months per HFPA.
The negotiation process was rarely as straightforward as the
above description implies. Indeed, the San Francisco experience proves
this point. As mentioned earlier, San Francisco was one of the initial
HFPAs to negotiate with GOSHN and the first HFPA to "close." The
experience in San Francisco resounded throughout the state, and other
hospitals took notice. The three largest hospitals providing services to
MediCal patients were not awarded contracts: St. Mary's, Mt. Zion, and
the University of California at San Francisco (UCSF). Together, these
three hospitals had historically provided about 40 percent of the MediCal
days in San Francisco. As the first HFPA to "close," the exclusion of
these three hospitals sent a powerful message to hospitals in other
HFPAs: play GOSHN's game, or don't get a MediCal contract. Outraged, St.
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Mary's and Mt. Zion hospitals brought lawsuits against the state claiming
that the state had made "arbitrary and capricious" decisions. St. Mary's
hospital went so far as to obtain a restraining order preventing the state
from excluding them from the MediCal programs. To avoid a long and costly
court battle, Guy "reopened" the San Francisco HFPA five months later.
Every San Francisco hospital received a MediCal contract during this
second round of negotiations.
After the San Francisco experience, the negotiations in the
remainder of the state went relatively smoothly. The remaining hospitals
cautiously negotiated with GOSHN, and no other lawsuits or major
complications arose. As of June 30, 1983, GOSHN had negotiated contracts
with 246 hospitals in 65 HFPAs, representing 67 percent of the hospitals
who entered the negotiations and accounting for 85 percent of historical
state MediCal expenditures. GOSHN was unable to negotiate satisfactory
agreements with hospitals in nine HFPA's, leaving these areas "open."
Areas in which other cost-effective health systems were being tested were
exempt from negotiations. By May 1983, GOSHN was able to estimate that
$238.1 million would be saved in the MediCal 1983-84 budget, based on a
month-of-service cycle. DHS estimated a lower figure, $162.3 million,
based on month of payment.
CMAC appointments were made in late December of 1982. As
specified in the legislation, Governor Brown appointed three
commissioners, one of whom was designated as the Chairman. The Speaker of
the Assembly and the Senate Rules Committee appointed two commissioners
each. The composition of the seven member CMAC resulted in a majority of
Democratic appointees. The commission included health care specialists
and lawyers, businessmen, a former Assemblyman and Congressman, and a
physician.
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During the six-month overlap in which CMAC and GOSHN coexisted,
CMAC met close to once a month to monitor GOSHN activities. In June, CMAC
met more often in preparation to take over selective contracting on July
1, 1983. According to AB 799, the Czar was to become the Executive
Director of CMAC. However, Guy had earlier made his intentions known, he
was going to retire to Maryland. Indeed, on July 1, 1983, Mr. Guy left
the state.
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CHAPTER III: STATE ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE
Under normal circumstances, the legislature would have empowered
the Department of Health Services (DHS), the single state agency
responsible for administering MediCal, with the task of negotiating the
selective contracts with hospitals. However, under the fiscal crisis,
legislators did not believe in the efficacy and efficiency of the
bureaucratic DHS. Instead, they brought in an outsider, endowed him with
tremendous discretionary powers and flexibility, and set him
hierarchically at the same level as the Director of DHS.
The creation of this special office with virtually no
legislative or state accountability poses several questions. For example,
was it necessary to create a special office with extraordinary powers to
implement hospital contracting? What was the relationship like between
the administering agency (DHS) and the negotiating agency (GOSHN)? What
adaptations did DHS have to make to accomodate GOSHN? And, finally, what
existing structures, if any, supported hospital contracting? This chapter
examines each of these questions.
3.1 Necessity of Special Office
The need to create a special office to negotiate contracts was
virtually unquestioned by respondents. Contracting with hospitals to
provide services to MediCal recipients had never been attempted. The
unique nature of contracting required, respondents felt, special attention
and staff. However, the need to place the special office outside DHS was
disputed by several respondents. Similarly, some observers questioned the
necessity to endow the special negotiator with extraordinary protection
against legal review and public disclosure.
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The concept of the "special negotiator" was a response to the
legislature's frustration with typical bureraucratic implementation
delays. As described in the previous chapter, the Director of DHS
publicly announced that implementation of contracting by the Department
would take three years. However, the Legislature needed a "quick fix" in
order to balance the 1982-1983 budget. Thus, a "special negotiator" with
complete authority, and located outside DHS, was established to direct the
negotiations. Was it really necessary to create a "Czar," and place him
outside the existing MediCal administrative agency?
The creation of a MediCal "Czar," with primary responsibility to
negotiate contracts with hospitals, was unprecedented. However, most
respondents believed that the only way to achieve rapid savings through
contracting was to give one person total command over the negotiation
process. Their rationale was based on the assumption that one individual
can make decisions more quickly than a commission- of individuals.
Furthermore, the lack of any legislative oversight insured rapid
implementation.
Coupled with this administrative freedom, certain character-
istics were necessary for the Czar's success. First and foremost, the
Czar, being in a sensitive and powerful position, would have to be immune
from political pressure. Second, he would have to be an executive capable
of making decisions with limited information. Third, the respect of the
health care industry and the confidence of the legislature would be
necessary to provide a sense of security in this time of uncertainty.
Finally, a "vision" of the health care system was necessary to guide his
actions.
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Respondents agreed that Mr. Guy had these four character-
istics. That he also had a natural gift of charasmatic leadership, as
well as hospital contracting experience, was a bonus. While it cannot be
determined whether Mr. Guy was indispensible, it can be said with
certainty that he contributed to the success of hospital contracting.
The necessity to place Mr. Guy and his staff outside DHS, the
existing structure to administer MediCal, is less clear. The general
perception is that DHS could not have implemented contracting as quickly
as an office outside the normal bureaucracy. Former GOSHN negotiators put
it this way: "DHS's attitude is to study something forever and then
implement it...if it had been up to DHS, they would still be thinking
about how to implement contracting." The former Director of DHS confirmed
this view with her declaration that contract implementation by DHS would
take three years. Furthermore, had DHS attempted to implement
contracting, achieving a consensus among the various department divisions
would have been a miracle. The department would have been "at war with
itself," according to a former DHS staff member.
Despite the pessimism, a few respondents thought that a special
office within DHS could have implemented hospital contracting. While in
the minority, these respondents cited one advantage of a special office
within DHS: the friction between DHS and GOSHN could have been avoided.
However, few could imagine Mr. Guy working for the DHS Director. The
image of Mr. Guy, with his political savvy and stature, working for a
state bureaucrat, like a DHS Director, was quite unlikely.
Similarly, many observers felt that it did not make sense to
separate the MediCal administration and contracting functions
indefinitely. The need to implement hospital contracting quickly would
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not be as acute in the second year since much of the components of
contracting would be established in the first year. In addition, DHS
staff expressed a proprietary concern that responsibility for negotiating
hospital contracts should rest with the MediCal administering agency.
Respondents often recommended that once GOSHN's tenure expired and
contracting had been set up, the negotiating functions could have been
handed over to a special unit within DHS.
The cloak of secrecy surrounding the negotiation process was
also questioned by many respondents. The Czar's exemption from public
scrutiny of the rates, terms, or conditions of any contracts, coupled with
the protection against disclosure of GOSHN's criteria for decisions
created a mystique about the negotiation process. Many hospital
administrators made a distinction between the need for secrecy about the
negotiated contract rates and the terms of the contract. For example, it
was accepted that to stimulate competition the negotiated rates should not
be disclosed. On the other hand, to keep the terms and conditions of the
contract confidential was not understandable. For one thing, not knowing
which hospitals provide certain services caused enormous transfer and
referral problems. Similarly, financial responsibility for transfer cases
became clouded because hospitals were not allowed to disclose the terms of
their contracts relating to service provisions. GOSHN staff acknowledged
these difficulties, but maintained that for the first year of contracting,
GOSHN needed all the leverage they could get. As one former negotiator
claimed, "not having people know [the contract terms] was an advantage."
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3.2 Relationship Between GOSHN and DHS
The relationship between DHS and GOSHN was flawed from the very
beginning, through no fault of either agency. By bringing in someone from
the outside to negotiate the contracts, the legislature made a stinging
statement: DHS was not capable of conducting the negotiations under the
necessary deadline. GOSHN and DHS began their working relationship on
this awkward footing.
The relationship between GOSHN and DHS evolved into an amicable
working relationship, after some initial stormy periods. The tension
stemmed from each agency's different objectives. As the state's
administering agency and only signer of the contracts, DHS had a vested
interest in ensuring that the negotiated contract terms were capable of
being operationalized. GOSHN's goal was to negotiate terms and rates that
would achieve target savings. However, negotiators would often face a
trade-off between achieving a lower rate and negotiating contract terms
that would be difficult, if not impossible, for DHS to implement.
Ultimately, experience was the best teacher. As one DHS staff claimed,
"Learning was evolutionary. The negotiators stopped making mistakes, and
we (DHS) stopped asking for certain provisions." However, the types of
problems that DHS encountered are instructive.
DHS was entirely excluded from the direct negotiations with
hospitals. Nevertheless, DHS's signature on the contracts committed the
state to the specified rates and terms. When GOSHN drafted the model
contract, DHS was anxious to review it. Despite DHS's concern, GOSHN was
reluctant to have DHS participate in the preparation of the model
contract. One DHS staff member remarked that "Guy did not want his
negotiators to talk to us [DHS] at all." Eventually, DHS had to review
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the contracts in order to sign them. Consequently, during the first wave
of contracting, DHS demanded that several items be changed in the model
contract before the DHS Director would sign them. The changes included:
refining the definition of inpatient services so that a hospital's
liability for transportation, outpatient, and emergency services rendered
prior to admission was limited: easing the requirement that hospitals
take action against medical staff who violate the Medical Staff Bylaws:
eliminating payment for "administrative days"; eliminating clauses that
restricted the MediCal Operations Division Chief's ability to interpret
the contracts; and adding a section mandating that the entire contract be
confidential. 1
Another issue that disturbed DHS was the lack of standardization
among the contracts. While the model contract served as a starting point,
the number and type of variations in contract terms achieved by the end of
the negotiation process was illuminating. As a DHS member said, "The
contracts are not the creatures that people think they are." DHS
encouraged the negotiators to negotiate consistent language and terms, but
did not feel they were successful. There were at least four major
departures from the standard contract:
(1) Most hospitals did not assume responsibility for all
inpatient services--responsibility was limited to services
normally provided at the given hospital. (This variation
became the rule, rather than the exception. Thus, each
contract was different.)
(2) Several hospitals negogiated two per diem rates, one for
general acute services and the other for neonatal intensive
care.
(3) Some hospitals negotiated capacity limits based on licensed
beds or available services.
(4) Some hospitals negotiated requirements that beneficiaries
could not be admitted by physicians without admitting
privileges at a given hospital.
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These deviations from the model contract allowed hospitals to control
their costs and mitigate their fear of patient "dumping" and becoming a
"MediCal hospital."
The most critical issue dividing GOSHN and DHS was over Appendix
A of the contract. The intent of Appendix A was to specify the services
excluded from the negotiated contract. Initially, this included a
narrative summary of the excluded services. However, the ambiguities
inherent in the text led DHS to request an explicit list of excluded
services. As a result, Appendix A lists the billing codes for excluded
services (i.e., not billable by the individual hospital).
Many providers in the first wave signed their contracts before
these billing codes had been filled in. The Director of DHS, on the
advice of her attorneys, refused to sign any hospital contracts unless
these billing codes were complete. GOSHN did not see the need for the
delay. The disagreement over Appendix A erupted in front of Governor
Brown, himself, right before his departure from office in December. The
Governor, anticipating an announcement of contract implementation as one
of his last acts in office, threatened to fire the DHS Director if she did
not sign the contracts. However, his own counsel advised him that the DHS
Director was correct in suggesting a delay in implementation. The dispute
between DHS and GOSHN over Appendix A, coupled with the other changes,
delayed the contract effective date from January 1, as originally planned,
to February 1, 1983 as DHS advocated.
Despite these difficulties and one month delay, GOSHN and DHS
completed all the tasks required to implement hospital contracting. DHS
cooperated in providing GOSHN with hospital-level data on historical costs
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and utilization; an agreement about the model contract was reached; a
contract review and monitoring system was established; and the list could
go on. Such an accomplishment is noteworthy.
3.3 Organizational and Procedural Changes in DHS
As mentioned previously, AB 799 accorded DHS the responsibility
of signing each hospital contract, thereby committing the state to the
specified rates and terms. However, the DHS Director's signature
represented more than the state's agreement with the contract. It also
represented a commitment to monitor hospital's compliance with their
contracts. Establishing the mechanisms to sign and monitor hospital
contracts required a number of organizational and procedural adaptations.
Seven divisions within DHS and the Department of Finance
reviewed the proposed hospital contracts for the DHS Director's signature
during the first year of negotiations. The DHS divisions included Audits
and Investigations, Licensing and Certification, Policy and Procedures,
Operations, Fiscal Intermediary Management, Administration, and Legal.
Given the pressure to implement hospital contracting as soon as possible,
GOSHN allocated five days per contract during which DHS was to solicit
comments from all seven divisions and incorporate the changes into the
contract. Although this new review function was assigned to these
divisions, no new units or staff were added to assist the process.
The Legal Division was the hub of all the activity. The
proposed contract was circulated among the divisions for their comments
before Legal rewrote the contract. However, it did not take long to
figure out that circulating the contracts among the other Divisions was
going to exceed the five day limit. The Legal Division hired runners to
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run between departments which helped to speed up the process. The
proposed contracts, along with each Division's comments, landed on the
desks of the four Legal staff who rewrote and modified the contracts.
More often than not, the five day review process turned into three hectic
days in which comments were solicited and the contract was modified. It
was a "wild and wooly period," to use the words of one DHS respondent.
As a result, 246 hospital contracts were negotiated and signed
within six months. Once all the contracts were negotiated, overall
responsibility for the hospital contract administration and monitoring
passed from the MediCal Legal Division to the Operations Division within
the DHS. Contract monitoring produced new duties for some divisions
within DHS including developing a beneficiary grievance and provider audit
system, adjusting the claims processing system, and creating a method to
communicate with recipients, hospitals, and physicians. The Hospital
Contracts Coordination Unit (HCCU) within the Operations Division was
responsible for the grievance and audit system. The Fiscal Intermediary
Management Division (FIMD) within DHS handled the oversight functions for
changes to the claims processing system. Recipient notification of
changes was handled by the Policy and Procedures Division. Similarly, an
ongoing notification system with hospitals and physicians was initiated by
HCCU.
DHS monitors client grievances and complaints through the
Beneficiary Complaint System. A client can call any DHS Division with a
complaint about service, providers or payments and the complaint will be
logged on an incident report form and forwarded to HCCU. In addition,
contract hospitals are required to establish a patient grievance system in
which MediCal patients complete the Patient Questionnaire about their
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satisfaction with the care they received. These questionnaires were also
monitored by HCCU. According to DHS, the volume of grievances is low--
only about 25 complaints had been received by the end of the first year of
contracting. Most of the grievances relate more to the patient's
perception of personal treatment rather than to the quality of care. For
example, patients would relate how rude a physician was or complained
about the hospital's housekeeping and food services rather than
complaining about the effectiveness of the procedures or treatments.
Although a patient grievance system is in place in each hospital, many
patients do not respond to the questionnaires. Many hospitals reported
response rates less than ten percent. Thus, reliance on beneficiary input
makes it difficult to evaluate patients' satisfaction with their medical
treatment under the contracting program.
To gain sufficient quality of care indicators, DHS developed an
Incident Review System to monitor hospital's compliance with their
contracts. Incident reports are routinely completed by units within DHS
who handle complaints from beneficiaries and providers. In addition, any
individual, including patients, hospital staff, or MediCal field office
personnel, can file an incident report. The types of incidents that are
reported involve:
e Admission delays or denials;
a Treatment and Transfer concerns relating to emergency room
treatment in a contract facility and transferring the patient
to another hospital for admission;
a Transfer concerns related to moving a MediCal patient from
one facility to another after the patient has been admitted
on an inpatient basis;
e Physician Privilege concerns in which a physician is unable
to admit MediCal patients to contract hospitals;
e Emergency Service availability and/or delivery;
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* Appropriate Service concerns related to emergency
transportation from patient pickup to arrival at the
hospital;
e Quality of Care concerns relating to incomplete or
unsatisfactory delivery of services.
Most incidents can be quickly resolved by the MediCal Field
Office, although both resolved and unresolved incidents are reported to
HCCU to be logged in for their review. A MediCal Consultant reviews all
complaints and makes an initial referral. For example, quality of care
concerns are referred to the Licensing and Certification Division.
Similarly, complaints regarding medical benefits are sent to the MediCal
Benefits Branch. Incidents are then categorized into three groups:
1) Non-incidents in which the facility activity is deemed
appropriate and within the limits of the MediCal model
contract;
2) Negotiated contract incidents in which the reported event is
deemed appropriate as a result of increased risk-bearing
deviation from the model contract; and
3) Contract violations in which the event is "clearly and
specifically disallowed under the terms and conditions of
the negotiated special hospital contract." 2
If contract violations are identified, the facility is issued a "warning
letter" in which the facility is informed that it faces possible contract
sanctions. However, the sanctions are limited. The first of the
available sanctions is to cut off the hospital's cash flow. If the
facility continues to disregard the contract violation, the DHS has only
one choice--to terminate the hospital's MediCal contract.
While the incident reporting system can have severe
consequences, only 13 contract violation warning letters have been sent,
and not one hospital has been terminated. Close to 500 incidents have
been reported as of November, 1983. Sixty-five percent of these incidents
concern emergency room treatment and transfer events. However, the
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majority of the incidents are classified as non-incidents. DHS has
identified two issues that appear to generate the incidents: 1) the
contractually allowable transfer of MediCal patients; and 2) the
confidentiality of the hospital contracts. 3
The high percentage of incidents involving transfer issues
indicates a problem with the interpretation or operation of transferring
patients. DHS points out that the original intention of the contracting
program was to have the initial contract hospital be fiscally responsible
for patients who need to be transferred to another hospital. However,
through the negotiations, hospitals were permitted to reduce their fiscal
responsibility and risk by "delegating" the transfer of MediCal patients
to other hospitals when their contract permits it. Thus, when transfer
cases are reviewed by the local MediCal field office and the reason for
the transfer is unclear, incident reports are filed. The contract
provisions most often allow the transfer, but appropriate transfers are
not readily identifiable due to the confidentiality of the contracts.
Transfer issues are not the only incidents stemming from the
confidential nature of the contracts. Excluded services, as specified in
Appendix A, also becomes a reported incident when hospitals are unaware of
another hospital's service provisions. DHS cites this example:
A contract hospital transfers a patient to another facility.
The contract hospital asserts it is not contractually
responsible for the continued care of the patient because the
required services are excluded from its contract. The receiving
hospital (which does not know the contents of the transferring
hospital's contract) requests clarification from the local
MediCal Field Office to determine what authorizations for
treatment should be obtained. The Field Office staff intervenes
to interpret the contract and instructs the receiving hospital
on how to seek reimbursement, that is, either from DHS because
the contract hospital correctly interpreted its contents or the
contract hospital maintains ongoing responsibility for the
patient's care.
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Such confusion about fiscal responsibility often initiates an incident
report. DHS takes the position that until the confidentiality constraints
on disclosure of covered/excluded services and risk-limiting provisions
are amended out of the contracts, confusion and incident reporting will
continue.
Adjustments to the claims processing system also suffered from
some of the confidentiality constraints. The claims processing system is
contracted out to a fiscal agent, Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC).
When hospital contracting was implemented, CSC had to adjust the claims
system to reflect each hospital's negotiated contract. FIMD monitored
CSC's design and implementation of these change orders. Designing and
implementing the changes to accommodate differences in each hospital's
contract was not trivial.
Changes to the Provider File included flagging contracting
hospitals, excluded services, and the corresponding negotiated rates.
Edits to the Reference File affected specific hospital information:
contracting hospital ID, rates for covered services (Med/Surg,
Psychiatric), excluded procedures or physician services (e.g., radiology
not covered), and the effective date of the rate or exclusion. If a
radiologist submits a claim for an inpatient service, the correct hospital
I.D. must be be supplied. Then, the claims system will check the Provider
File to see if the hospital contracts with the state and if radiology is a
covered service. If radiology is excluded, the claim will be denied. If
radiology is covered, the Reference File will verify the hospital I.D. and
identify the negotiated rate for the individual service. Thus, one
physician's claim for services rendered in one hospital will be denied,
but paid for in another hospital.
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CSC was given only three months to design, develop, and
implement the reimbursement changes orders, at the cost of $250,000.
Total operating costs were close to $964,000. To say the least, CSC and
FIMD found themselves in a quagmire of operational problems. Initially,
the system required a series of system change orders. GOSHN negotiators
would often fail to consult with FIMD staff on the feasibility of
translating contract language into system logic. For example, CSC was
unable to identify whether particular services were included in the
rate. As a result, many claims were temporarily suspended until the
ambiguity in service exclusions was clarified in Appendix A.
Not only were there operational problems, but there were also
user problems. The most common of which resulted from contracting
hospitals having two provider identification numbers. The old provider ID
identified services not included in the reimbursement rate while the new
provider ID identified the negotiated per diem. Claims were often
submitted with the incorrect ID. These claims were also temporarily
suspended until new edits and screens were in place to correct the ID's.
Over time and with experience, CSC and FIMD refined the system so that it
operated more efficiently and smoothly.
The changes in the MediCal program required that recipients be
notified. Prior to hospital contract implementation, the Policies and
Procedures Division mailed a brief flyer to each MediCal recipient
describing the impending changes. Clients were confused and did not
understand the effective impact that contracting would have on them. As a
result, DHS asked physicians to inform their MediCal patients of which
hospitals were participating in the MediCal program. It was felt that the
physicians would be more effective in notifying clients of the impending
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changes in hospital status. In addition, the need for recipients to be
aware of the changes was not as crucial, particularly since the concept of
being "locked out" of a hospital within an area called an HFPA would not
be meaningful to them.
In addition to communicating with recipients and physicians,
hospitals needed clarification and notification of ongoing issues. The
Hospital Contracts Coordination Unit (HCCU) within the Operations Division
was established to receive calls from hospitals to clarify contract
language, settle delegation issues, and so forth. Most of the calls
concerned claims payment problems or medical necessity issues. In
addition to fielding questions for immediate resolution, DHS conceived of
a "Hospital Contract Letter" series to be sent to all contract hospitals,
notifying providers of ongoing developments. However, DHS explained that
the series has yet to be written, but was expected to begin in March,
1984.
3.4 Prior Authorization System
A critical feature of implementing hospital contracting was the
state's prior authorization system. While not an organizational
adaptation to contracting, the prior approval process was a fundamental
structure supporting hospital contracting. Under a per diem rate, a
financial incentive is created for hospitals to increase their revenues by
extending a patient's length of stay or decreasing the number of ancillary
procedures. Had the prior authorization process not been in place,
hospitals who negotiated MediCal rates lower than their marginal or
average costs may have been tempted by this potential loophole. However,
the prior approval system maintains such a tight control on the number of
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procedures and inpatient days that such abuse was unlikely to occur.
Thus, DHS already had a system in place that regulated the most sensitive
and vulnerable aspects of hosital contracting -- length of stay and
ancillary services.
The prior approval system was implemented in 1967 in an effort
to reduce unnecessary procedures and to control extended hospital stays.
Treatment Authorization Requests (TARS) are submitted by each hospital to
their local Field Office before any procedure or service can be delivered
to a MediCal patient. Emergency services are reviewed on a post service
basis. If medically justified and documented, the emergency procedure is
authorized. Requests to transfer a MediCal patient to another hospital
for special procedures also have to be submitted. Local MediCal
Consultants review each TAR to approve the treatment as well as the number
of inpatient days. Unless proper and complete documentation accompanies
the TAR, the hospital is denied payment. Claims are not processed by the
fiscal intermediary until the local MediCal office approves each TAR.
Hospital contracting, in and of itself, minimally affected the
prior authorization process. There were a few initial problems, some of
which were resolved and others that persisted. However, some MediCal
Field Office staff actually argued that contracting improved their ability
to detect "patient dumping" incidents. To understand this improvement, it
is first necessary to describe how transfers are handled by the Field
Offices under contracting.
Under contracting, transfer requests are approved only if the
procedure is one of the excluded services listed in Appendix A of the
originating hospital's contract. In a valid transfer case, the receiving
hospital is responsible for billing the state. However, a transfer could
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become a "delegation" if the service is covered by the originating
hospital's contract, but the originating hospital cannot provide the
service (either because their beds are full, or because the originating
hospital does not provide the serivce even though it is not listed in
Appendix A). In the case of a valid delegation, the originating hospital
is responsible for billing the state.
Transfers and delegations that do not meet the conditions of the
originating hospital's contract often include those cases that are
economically attractive to "dump" onto another hospital. For example, a
high risk and complicated MediCal case requiring a high degree of the
hospital's resources is more likely to be "dumped" onto another hosital
than a case needing less intensive care. Similarly, some MediCal patients
may be "re-routed" to another hospital because beds filled with private
payers are reimbursed at higher rates than beds filled with MediCal
patients. Thus, field office nurses pay close attention to each transfer
request to insure that valid transfers and delegations are approved, and
that "dumping" does not occur.
Prior to contracting, field office nurses reviewed transfers,
but not with the same intensity as under contracting. For each transfer
request, the field office examines the Emergency Room and Transportation
Logs at both the originating and receiving hositals, whereas previously,
that log review was periodic. As a result, field office staff felt that
they were better able to identify cases that are "dumped" onto another
hosital.
These intense reviews for transfer requests are necessary under
contracting since a hospital's transfer behavior is dictated by their
contract. To conduct this review, field office staff need to be familiar
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with each hospital's contract, particularly the excluded services in
Appendix A. However, the field offices did not have copies of the
contracts when contracting went into effect, creating some confusion about
how to deal with those early transfer requests. Ultimately, the contracts
were delivered to the field offices and review of transfer cases became
somewhat routine. The ambiguity in Appendix A, however, presented
constant confusion. One field office administrator explained: "It is
still difficult to figure out which hospital is responsible for specific
services. We still get some cases where we think one hospital is
responsible, but then a lawyer will find a phrase (in the contract) and
the hospital won't be responsible.
While hospital contracting did not dramatically change the prior
authorization process, the change in the definition of medical necessity
did. Language adopted by AB 799 redefined "medical necessity" for care
under MediCal to only include services necessary "to protect life or
prevent significant disability." Thus, TAR criteria for approving
particular treatments was seriously narrowed. In effect, the change made
it more difficult for MediCal patients to obtain elective services.
To implement the new definition of medical necessity, the DHS
developed five lists identifying allowable procedures. MediCal field
offices were to use these lists in approving TARS. The first list
included procedures that were automatically denied and if challenged,
rarely approved. The second list included procedures generally considered
to be elective and were only approved if the procedure met the "life and
disability" test or the other criteria. The third list covered surgical
procedures requiring prior authorization. The fourth list included
procedures typically done in inpatient settings but now rendered in an
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ambulatory surgical center. Finally, the fifth list covers common office
procedures that would be reimbursed at only 80 percent of the usual
MediCal allowance.
Criteria for approving the number of patient days was not as
clearly spelled out as the lists for allowable procedures. Formally,
field office staff use a manual that cites a standard number of inpatient
days by type of diagnosis. However, in practice, field office nurses
approve the minimum number of inpatient days they "can get away with,"
without creating an uproar from the hospital. One field office nurse
explained: "As soon as we find one person who goes home a day earlier
(than the standard), we lower our standard. If I can squeeze another day
out of the length of stay, and make it stick, I will convince others that
it works and after a while it will become sort of a state standard."
Thus, there is considerably less standardization on approvals for length
of stay than on treatments.
Provider reaction to the tightening of the prior approval
process was mixed. Most hospitals and the California Medical Association
(CMA) believe that the state should provide safeguards against unnecessary
utilization. However, CMA claims that:
"specific circumstances for individual patients are unique and
prior authorization requirements should not be interpreted
arbitrarily. When there is doubt as to the medical necessity,
this question should be resolved in favor of the patient and his
or her attending physician." 5
Testimony by providers and individual MediCal recipients before the
Assembly Committee on Health in October 1983 cite several cases in which
TARs were denied because they were not necessary to prevent death or
disability, but nonetheless were a medical necessity. For example, one
physician presented this case:
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A diabetic was seen in the emergency room one Saturday with a
fractured jaw that was terribly swollen. He was sent home over
the weekend to put ice on his jaw so that he could be admitted
on Monday, his diabetes controlled, and his jaw wired on
Tuesday. When he came in on Monday, a TAR was not submitted
because the physician was under the impression that this was an
urgent emergency case that didn't need a TAR. The admission was
denied because the TAR was not submitted on Monday; however,
Tuesday's care was covered because the review nurse for MediCal
was already in the hospital and saw the case and approved the
second day of his stay. That's a situation where the TAR
process really interferes with the care that everyone would
agree would be necessary. There's no question that someong with
a fractured jaw with diabetes needs to be in the hospital.
In addition to the ambiguity over the definition of a medical
necessity, hospital revenues are affected. In the above example, since a
portion of TAR was denied, the patient would have to pay the bill. In
many cases, patients do not have the money so the costs are added to the
hospital's charity care. Similarly, a CHA study reported that fewer
Medical patients were hospitalized. MediCal patient census dropped by an
average 16.3 percent in the fourth quarter, compared to a 9.16 percent
decline in the third quarter of 1982.7 This decrease in MediCal inpatient
utilization was in large part due to the change in the definition of
medical necessity which became effective in September 1982, during the
third quarter. Hospital administrators credited a "reluctance to incur
medical expenses during uncertain economic times" and that patients are
uncertain about the services available to them. "Fearing rejection, some
are reluctant to seek medical treatment." Hospitals expressed a concern
about their loss in revenue resulting from the change in definition of
medical necessity.
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CHAPTER IV: KEY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SUCCESS
This chapter presents the major findings regarding the adoption
of AB 799 and the state's response to hospital contracting in
California. Three questions guide this chapter. The first question asks
how did the conditions surrounding the adoption process affect the type of
program initially adopted? The second question focuses on how the state's
organizational reponse to hospital contracting influenced the initial
stages of implementation. Finally, based on the results of these two
questions, implications for the program's success are discussed.
4.1 Key Findings: The Adoption Process
The major forces leading to the adoption of and patterns in the
process of enacting hospital contracting are based on three interrelated
factors:
" the state's fiscal crisis;
" the costly MediCal program; and
" the perverse incentives inherent in the organization of the
health care system.
The definition of the problem was ambiguous. To help solve the
first issue, legislators relied on solving the second one; and to solve
the second one, they felt they had to tackle the third issue. The fiscal
crisis was the driving force, but the key to the "MediCal solution" lay in
the organization of the health care system. Each 'solution' was
conditional on the previous 'solution.' Hospital contracting emerged as a
structural reform to the perverse incentives in the organization of the
health care system.
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At the same time, contracting was intended to save $100 million in General
Funds. These savings would reduce MediCal's share of the state budget
which, in turn, would alleviate the state's fiscal crisis.
The combination of the above three concerns overrode any
opposition to hospital contracting. In particular, three political
strategies insured bipartisan support and passage of AB 799. First, the
weekly meetings among the Democratic and Republican legislative leadership
united what is typically a partisan issue. Second, AB 799, AB 3480, and
SB 2012 were analyzed and rewritten by the same six key members of both
Houses and parties. Third, an urgency clause was added to AB 799 and SB
2012 and all three bills were tied procedurally to the Budget Act. Voting
against either AB 799 or AB 3480 was, indirectly, voting against the
Budget Act. These strategies helped the Legislature gain greater
flexibility over and control of the policy-making process. Because of
this flexibility and control, the Legislature was in a position to resist
external pressure.
Indeed, countervailing forces surrounding the adoption of
hospital contracting were ineffective. Efforts by the powerful medical
lobbies, CHA and CMA, failed miserably. Their failure advanced the
adoption of hospital contracting for two reasons: (1) the perceived
crisis and the political strategies counteracted any leverage that CMA and
CHA was able to wield; and (2) the lobbies did not propose any
alternatives or compromises to the fiscal crisis.
The opposing forces failed, not because their arguments were
suppressed, but because of their arrogance. The conspicuous absence of
alternative proposals, coupled with their persistent opposition, diluted
any effect they might have had on the Legislature. This quote from the
San Francisco Chronicle characterizes the situation best:
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"What really happened was that CMA outsmarted itself. The
Legislature had been their mistress, well paid, for a long time,
but when they accused it of being a whore, they overdid it.
What they said was 'We have sufficient power to stop your budget
if you lon't take those items out.' But they did not have the
votes."
Efforts by the countervailing forces backfired to a point where compromise
solutions were not even considered.
Regardless of the forces working for or against adoption, the
fact that this health care reform took place in California should not go
unnoticed. California has a history for being in the forefront of things
to come. Indeed, the California experience will be a litmus test for
other states considering drastic restructuring of their health care
system. California's cultural/political orientation influenced the
program's degree of deviation from the norm and from existing bureaucratic
systems. The state's flair for the unusual created a climate in which
hospital contracting could thrive. The California Legislature is
accustomed to risk-taking and trying new ideas, like hospital contracting.
The conditions surrounding the adoption process will influence
the strategy chosen to implement a program's objectives. For example,
where adoption is not crisis-oriented, the legislation may call for a more
gradual, phased-in approach (i.e., over 3-5 years) to regulation. In
contrast, an impending Medicaid crisis will more likely prompt swift and
immediate implementation. However, concomittant with swift implementation
is the lack of time to prepare a comprehensive system. For instance, this
would include establishing a uniform reporting and accounting system, or
developing a detailed rate review process. As a result of this lack of
preparation, legal and legislative challenges are likely, as evidenced by
the legal battle that ensued in San Francisco.
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Indeed, in the first month of negotiations and in the first HFPA
to 'close,' three hospitals entered into a lawsuit against the state
claiming that the state's decision to reject their bids was arbitrary and
capricious. One hospital obtained an injunction to prevent the state from
excluding the hospital from the MediCal program. The crisis orientation
of the Legislature led to immediate implementation of hospital contracting
but, as a result, was vulnerable to appeals and legal challenges.
4.2 Key Findings: Organizational Response
The bills identify the negotiating and administering agencies
for implementing hospital contracting with general directions for carrying
out tasks. However, DHS and GOSHN are semi- or wholly autonomous and have
large discretionary power over their activities. The assumption that
policy-makers control the organizational, political and technological
processes affecting implementation is threatened by the dual
responsibility and relative strength of each agency.2
DHS was concerned not only with their legally mandated goals,
but also with their organizational maintenance and survival. 3 GOSHN
threatened DHS's survival and competence. Tension was created by the mere
fact that GOSHN existed outside the normal bureaucracy and was given the
responsibility for negotiating the contracts--a responsibility seen by DHS
as their domain. This tension was exacerbated by DHS having the
responsibility to administer and monitor the contracts, making DHS heavily
dependent on the decisions made by GOSHN. Three factors were problematic:
* giving GOSHN a responsibility that would typically be under
DHS's authority;
* placing GOSHN outside the existing bureaucratic structure;
and
* linking GOSHN's decisions to DHS's activities.
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These three legislative mandates established a perfect setting for a
"turf" battle.
Decisions requiring joint agreement between DHS and GOSHN
instigated the 'battle.' Mutual agreement on the contracts was required
before any contract became effective. As described previously, DHS would
not sign any contracts that GOSHN negotiated until Appendix A was
clarified and completed by the contracting hospital. This 'battle'
resulted in a one month delay in contract negotiations.
The complexity of joint action can explain the one month
delay. According to Pressman and Wildavsky:
"the probability of agreement by every participant on each
decision must be exceedingly high for there to be ny chance at
all that a program will be brought to completion."
Thus, the one month delay in contract negotiations can be attributed to
the initial tension established by the legislation and to the complexity
of joint agreement.
In one sense, a one month delay is not a long time. However,
given the concern for immediate implementation and that Governor Brown
wanted to declare hospital contracting as his last act in office, the
delay represented a near disaster. DHS was victorious in asserting itself
against GOSHN. Thereafter, GOSHN treated DHS seriously, although somewhat
reluctantly. As a result, joint decisions were made with less tension.
The scope of authority vested in the Czar represents the
Legislature's sense of urgency and desperation to solve the fiscal
crisis. The Legislature needed a "fixer" who was willing to deliberately
disregard the hierarchy and to intervene wherever a breakdown occurred. 5
Mr. Guy accepted these terms. As discussed above, the consequences of
scant regard for DHS delayed contract negotiations. On the other hand,
positive results occurred during the negotiation process with individual
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hospitals. It was not uncommon for Mr. Guy to intervene in particularly
difficult negotiations. Mr. Guy, the hospital's CEO, and the GOSHN staff
negotiator would often arrive at a mutually agreeable contract.
Finally, DHS was given the responsibility of administering and
monitoring a program that was shaped by an outside agency. In addition,
hospital contracting was not the result of a systematic or pre-programmed
set of ideas that DHS had only to execute. It was, rather, the result of
a process-oriented, heuristic mode of planning.
It is no wonder that the organizational and procedural
adaptations by DHS reflected an ad hoc or "trial and error" approach. The
exchange between FIMD and the fiscal intermediary best exemplifies this
process. Five change orders were needed to finally arrive at a working
payment system. Resolution to problems presented by hospitals calling the
HCCU within the Operations Division was similarly evolutionary. Perhaps,
"implementation as evolution" describes hospital contracting. As Majone
and Wildarsky state:
"Unless a policy is narrow and uninteresting (i.e., pre-
programmed), the policy will never be able to contain its own
consequences. Implementation will always be evolutionary it
will inevitably reformulate as well as carry out policy."
4.3 Implications for Success
Based on the foregoing discussions, what can be said about the
potential success of hospital contracting? This report has examined only
two areas of hospital contracting: the conditions surrounding the
adoption process and the state's organizational response to hospital
contracting. The bidding process, both from the state's and hospitals'
perspectives, as well as the impact of contracting on patients, hospitals,
or state savings have yet to be considered. Indeed, this report on
California is only a beginning.
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Yet, a reading of the bills and of statements made by
legislators, DHS staff, and legislative analysts involved in the policy-
making process, indicate some measures of success. The legislative intent
of AB 799 was to:
e decrease the rate of MediCal expenditures;
a slow the rate of all health care expenditures (i.e., using
state policy to dampen health care inflation);
e promote organized health care delivery systems;
* promote new methods of reimbursement for health care
services; and
* maintain access to quality health care for the poor.
These objectives are multiple and may be vague and competing.
"To decrease the rate of MediCal expenditures" may be in conflict with
"maintaining access to quality health for the poor." Also, exactly how is
"laccess to quality care" or "decrease the rate of MediCal expenditures"
defined? Is there a specific number against which access, quality, or
expenditures will be measured?
Similarly, depending on the audience, success will be measured
differently. The primary interest groups have competing priorities. For
most legislators, the level of state savings will be the priority.
Hospital administrators will be concerned with the methods of
reimbursement. Physicians will be concerned about the viability of their
fee-for-service model, but will also focus on maintaining the quality of
services (in terms of high technology and specialization). For MediCal
recipients, access and freedom of choice will be at stake. Each priority
calls for a different set of measures, not necessarily congruent with one
another.
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Hospital contracting provoked two fundamental shifts in power
and influence. First, there is a shift from DHS to the Czar. The Czar
was an attempt by legislators to overcome what they perceived as the
unresponsiveness of traditional bureaucracy. In this sense, if the main
characteristic of government is not "separation of powers" but rather
separate institutions sharing powers, this first shift can be seen as a
shift from the executive to the legislative branch of government.7 If the
Czar and GOSHN can transform the relationships between government,
hospitals, and physicians in one year, it will be interesting to see if
this experience will "transfer" to other sectors of public policy.
Replicability can be yet another measure of success.
The second major shift is among providers from physicians to
administrators. Alford would categorize this shift from "professional
monopolists" to "corporate rationalizers." 8 Administrators will no longer
depend solely on physicians to bring them patients and money. For large
groups of patients, the "choice" of hospital and/or physician will be
determined by GOSHN and DHS. Since physicians are the primary generator
of services in a hospital, administrators will have to monitor and control
physician activities if they do not want costs to be higher than the
negotiated contract rate. This shift has been characterized by Mr. Guy
when he said that health care is changing "from a social system.... to an
economic system."9 Perhaps, economic factors will be more of a
determinant of success than the political and social factors.
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